This article encourages accountants to consider their role in the debates concerning social and environmental accounting. It outlines a placement ethic which provides a framework to explore various schools of thought on social and environmental accounting. A placement ethic uses ideas central to Habermas and Rawls to provide a continuum model to explore whether an arbitrated political consensus concerning social and environmental accounting is a possibility. It also advances some ideas to overcome the procedural limitations of the RawlsHabermas debate that have been used by accounting reformers. In this context, it is possible to move beyond the usual deadlock between procedure and critique to combine insights from different traditions to construct new critical and democratic social and environmental pathways.
Introduction
Over the years various rationales have been advanced to support social and environmental accounting practices. Social and environmental accountants have called for the inclusion in accounting of information that will capture some of the 'external' effects of business activity and 'by doing so, encourage behaviour which will ameliorate the consequences of western economic life' (Gray et al. 1996, p. 2) . The calls for more detailed reporting have been matched by a radical and critical analysis of the role of accounting as a social phenomenon (see Tinker et al. 1991) . This article investigates the democratic implications of the debate between critical accounting theorists and proponents of environmental and social accounting using what I call a 'placement ethic'. I use the accounting implications associated with the work of Habermas and Rawls to explore whether a placement ethic can help clarify differences and then develop a dialogue between the different schools of thought on accounting reform (see Gaa, 1988) . This endeavour reflects W. B. Yeats' haunting question which completed his 'The Second Coming ': And what rough beast, its hour come round at last Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?
Yeats' refrain, used by many theorists concerned with the direction of liberal democracies, offers a metaphor against the colonisation of our collectivities. The central issues to keep in mind concerns the extent to which the democratic and republican ideals central to both Rawls and Habermas provide ways to think about pathways to social change and justice. In keeping in mind the democratic ideals implicit in reform accounting, it is important to consider the problems and possibilities within various philosophical perspectives. Each of the perspectives outlined in the placement ethic are concerned with detailing the good life, or better society.
I argue, therefore, that in evaluating the reform pathways implicit in the various schools of thought a first step is made toward change through a placement ethic. It involves exploring the different schools of thought to determine whether a consensus can be achieved. The notion of a placement ethic resulted in a journey which traversed the shores of social and environmental accounting as a means to explore humanity's adverse impacts on the natural environment. This journey is in three main sections. The first outlines the dominant frameworks in the literature concerning the role of social and environmental accounting and traces some key differences between the various schools of thought. The second develops a systematic understanding of the discursive procedures implicit in the work of Habermas and Rawls in working towards a process that reconciles corporations with their communities. The third section concludes with a discussion concerning the limitations associated with procedural accountability and considers critical objections to the notion of a placement ethic (see Cooper, 1992 , Puxty (1991 ) Tinker et. al. 1991 . The two issues to be borne in mind concern the serviceability of accounting and the extent to which accounting reform can respond to the critical critique which calls for a fundamental transformation of the relations of production.
I Perspectives on social and environmental accounting
Liberal accountability Over the years, various interpretations of social and environmental accounting have been advanced. In the work of Gray et al. ( , 1995a Gray et al. ( , 1995b , Gray and Laughlin (1991) and Parker (1986 Parker ( , 1991 Parker ( , 1994 Parker ( , 1997 liberal perspectives were developed to justify social accounting as an evolutionary mechanism.
2 These liberal perspectives were aligned with stakeholder theory as a means to report to relevant publics as opposed to a narrowly defined range of financial users. Underlying liberal accountability are stakeholder needs concerning corporate accountability and policy (Guthrie and Parker 1989; Parker 1994; Fleischman et al. 1996; Parker 1997) . In Parker's early social accounting work, in particular, a case was made for social accounting standards to regulate corporate activities and report to relevant publics. 3 Parker argued that his position moves towards the provision of decision-useful social information (1991, p. 3) and can be used as a vehicle to inform different stakeholders and groups in society. In effect, information is decision-useful when the benefits of reporting it are greater than the costs of providing it. But this perspective offers only a naïve exploration of the debates that affect the mechanisms of communication in communities. Gray et al.'s (1996) and Parker's (1991) liberal accounting took shape in the early 1990s through their debate with Tony Puxty. Puxty developed Habermas' early model 4 on communicative competence as a means to criticise the liberal gradualism of ) and the conservative liberalism of Guthrie (1989, 1991) and Guthrie and Parker (1999) . Central to the perspectives developed by and Parker (1991) was the notion that Puxty's critical perspective, in fact, left open social and environmental reporting to the powerful groups that radicals mistrust. The liberal and conservative positions of Gray/Owen/Parker/Guthrie shared an underlying faith that the current social system could be reformed. 5 In recent times, Parker and Guthrie (1999) have branched into many areas of accounting in their repeated call for a broader dialogic model not dissimilar to Puxty's Habermasian position (see Fleischman et al. 1996) . In his recent environmental work, Parker (1997) extends his social accounts to include ecological implications. Still, there is no analysis concerning whether this information is acted on by relevant publics, whether it reflects a qualitative improvement in financial reporting or whether it is just an ideological cloak to protect corporations. In the debates over the serviceability of social and environmental accounting, Gray et al. ( , 1996 offer a more advanced liberal 2 It is important to remember that many versions of liberalism have been developed. In the accounting literature the dominant discursive frameworks have not differentiated between these schools of thought that submerge the dialectic of liberalism. However, it is also important to remember that social accountants are indeed ambivalent about the form in which these reports should take. 4 It is important to note that Puxty takes Habermas' model in a critical direction that is at variance with Habermas' own procedural predilection. Power and Laughlin (1996) add that Puxty's neutral procedure is similar to that of Rawls (see Gray et al. 1996) .
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A limitation with philosophical liberal pragmatism, however, concerns the opportunities for better accounting that can be expressed by the ideal speech situation (see section II). model than the perspective of Guthrie and Parker (1991) . Implicit in their argument is the supposition that the accounting profession is a mechanism for change through the notion of an overlapping consensus. Gray et al. (1987) advocated an expanded accounting in liberal democracies and in their early writings their middle-ground position incorporated divergent philosophical stances on accountability issues. They used the liberalism of Berlin (1969) , McPherson (1979) and Rawls (1971) to justify 'emerging social accounting trends' to support a middle ground where change occurs and differences are accommodated. Gray et al. (1996) developed a distinctly Rawlsian perspective to create the conditions for achieving an overlapping consensus, though there is no reason to suggest that Rawlsian liberalism necessarily leads to an emerging trend (Gray et al. 1988) . Put differently, they are talking about pluralism in its modern form, which concerns the many different viewpoints and value systems that exist. They state:
...we see little fruitful development in merely standardising social accounting techniques in the absence of a more fundamental political challenge being mounted to the privileges of existing corporate power in capitalist society. However, our analysis parts from that of Puxty in seeing the necessary seeds of change already implanted in such a society and therefore a role for social accounting in developing a far wider form of accountability. (Gray et al. 1991, p. 14, emphasis in original) This argument takes decided steps towards a broader ethical framework that supports Nelson's (1993) view that accounting must develop, and is developing, its internal goods of narration, virtue and social recognition. Gray et al.'s (1991 Gray et al.'s ( , 1996 call for more detailed social and environmental information reflects Rawls' concern not to exclude minorities in a democracy but to create the conditions for social justice, openness and closeness.
In recent work, Gray et al. (1995a Gray et al. ( , 1995b and Owen et al. (1997) extend this perspective to consider the 'popularisation' of the critical accounting field. More particularly, the Gray-Owen school has developed two different, but quite useful, political economy perspectives (see Gray et al. 1995a Gray et al. , 1995b Owen et al. 1997) . First, Gray et al. (1995a) develop a bourgeois political perspective where corporations are obliged to report to relevant publics. This model assumes that bourgeois political economy can be developed as part of the social-environmental accounting project while simultaneously tackling the interests of capital. Second, Owen et al. (1997) adapt their earlier liberal perspective to develop an accounting framework which works toward the provision of additional information in annual reports to satisfy relevant publics concerning corporate effects on social and environmental issues. Gray et al. (1995a) and Owen et al. (1997) are about defining points of intersection between critical, environmental and social accounting. They recognise that the middle ground itself has become contested, as it presupposes that a settlement can be achieved between alternative moral perspectives without the need to resort to any comprehensive doctrines. Gray et al. (1987) explain this convergence:
These two points of view are essentially different ways of looking at the issues (Held, 1980) and are, fundamentally, irreconcilable in that the bourgeois perception treats as important issues which the Marxian analysis will see as relatively trivial. (Gray et al. 1995b, p. 53) Here, Gray et al. bring together bourgeois and Marxian political economies as a part of an overlapping consensus which echoes their Kantian liberal sources. 6 They remain committed to the supposition that change can be achieved within the current social structure. In a similar way to that of Rawls they do not theorise the role of the state (see Lehman, 1995 Lehman, , 1999 . It is probably for this reason that radical critics argue that their framework still needs to consider the relationships between accounting, the public sphere and the state (see section II).
Puxty's critique of liberal accounting reform
By addressing the three liberal points overlooked by Parker, 7 Puxty exposed some theoretical difficulties for 'reform accounting' (Puxty 1986 (Puxty , 1988 ). Puxty's work is important because he develops Habermas' perspective that it is through communication that we assert and justify normative statements. The importance of Habermas is that he develops a way to think about resolving disputes through the development of maxims that have moral force. Puxty recognises this and uses it to critique the reform liberalism of Parker/Guthrie and Gray/Owen. Central to Puxty's discourse ethic is to provide critical additional information to inform relevant publics and question the liberal assumption that evolutionary change can satisfy accountability obligations between interlocutors. He concluded that, in providing additional information in annual reports social accounting, in particular, failed to account for 'other' things and merely justified the accumulation of capital in satisfying the demands of the few at the expense of the community. In his response to Puxty's (1991) criticisms Parker has admitted his approach to be fraught with dangers, as powerful groups could manage information for their own purposes.
It is important to remember that Puxty developed Habermas' communicative ethic to unmask power relations in communities. Habermas' work is usually developed to reform democratic structures, but never explicitly questions the institutions of liberaldemocratic societies. In effect, Puxty sets up the debate between the various schools of thought in accounting concerning whether social change can be created by individuals taken severally (as Rawls would have it), or whether change is determined through a consensus reached (as Habermas maintains) in a discursive arena. The debates between Puxty's (1997) discourse model and reform accounting have important ramifications for the construction of an overlapping consensus between the various schools of thought on accounting reform.
According to Puxty's framework, of even more critical importance for social and environmental accounting is the need to improve the quality of dialogue in the community. For this reason, Habermas' argument for broader public spheres becomes important in social and environmental accounting debates. It is quite problematic whether accounting, in its present form, has led to fairness, let alone truth. Habermas explains:
Every valid norm must satisfy the condition that the consequences and side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of the interests of each could be freely accepted by all affected (and be preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation). (Habermas 1993a, p. 32) [emphasis in original] What is at issue is a fundamental transformation of the institutions that perpetuate many injustices in the name of economic growth and progress-unfettered capitalism. Accounting is a social grid from which a more meaningful consensus can emerge (see for example, Arrington and Puxty 1991, p. 31) . Hence, without reflecting on the institutional structures in society (as does Rawls) or the communicative structures of contemporary society (as does Habermas), we cannot conclude that a 'gradual' change through social accounting standards will lead us to a society in which powerful groups will be less dominant (Parker 1991) . It is worthwhile remembering Puxty's (1991) criticisms of procedural liberal accounting models:
The world of the 1980s is one that has flourished, but it does not display a world of greater accountability. On the contrary we find a world in which bankers are attempting to oblige some of the poorest countries to retrench further, in which stock manipulation and insider dealing are rife, in which power in the U.K. is becoming concentrated at the centre of government, and in which distribution of income and wealth is becoming progressively more unequal. (Puxty 1991, p. 37) Puxty's work reminds us that procedural liberal accountants fail to justify why they accept the pluralism of the status quo and capitalist society in the first place (cf. Rawls 1971, pp. 11-14; 1987, pp. 2, 4, 5-8) . Indeed, corporations, in contrast to other sectors of society, have 'structural strengths', and the more general structure of accounting, of which social and environmental accounting is just one part, can be seen as a means through which that structural strength can be maintained (Puxty 1986, p. 101) .
It seems that the liberal reform project has failed to address the core concerns of the Puxty (1991 Puxty ( , 1997 and Tinker (1991) school of thought, which expressed grave reservations concerning corporate social reporting. While constructive model building might lead to some significant and meaningful developments there is some doubt as to whether 'popularisation' in the case of an environmental agenda, which contains aspects of a deep green critique of capitalism, has produced any new constructs (Maunders and Burritt, 1991).
Tinker and radical accounting
The critical accounting school harks back to a political economy framework which was critical of the type of liberalism adapted by the Gray/Owen school of thought. In recent times, critical frameworks have blossomed in a strategic direction through deconstruction, often in the context of a post-Marxist analysis. Returning to the accounting literature, Cooper (1992) has argued that environmental accounting fails to tackle the patriarchal formations, which has resulted in a male dominated and environmentally destructive society. From his Habermasian perspective, Puxty (1988 Puxty ( , 1991 has explained that social accounting is a chimera for organised capitalism, and fails as a communicative medium. From a distinctly Marxian perspective, Tinker et al. (1991) argue that social accounting is a rationalisation of the capitalist process and results in the commodification of labour power.
8 While there is some convergence between the various schools of thought, the bourgeois political economy perspective developed by Gray et al. (1995a Gray et al. ( , 1995b has been criticised because it does not explore Marxian dialectics.
9 More particularly, this strand of political economy is seen to actually support the institutions of modernity (see Cooper 1992; Tinker et al. 1991 ). Marx's dialectical logic is used to reconsider the relationships between civil society and the state, which can be used to explore reform accounting. It is problematic, however, whether the Gray-Owen framework tackles the entrenched interests of capital which alienate people and destroy nature.
Furthermore, Tinker et al.'s work offers a different interpretation of political economy from that of Gray et al. (1995a) and, even if compatibility can be detected, a dialectical Marxian (bourgeois political economy) perspective offers a non-empirical and teleological means to think about constructing new worlds. Following Tinker et al. (1991) , reform liberalism is limited by liberal procedure and a narrow role for the state; that is, the Gray / Owen school of thought do not discuss the inter-relationships between state and civil society as new modes of democratic governance. A second concern deals with developing a liberal consensus to locate areas of agreement between different interlocutors (see Gray et al. 1988) .
The task at hand is to determine the possibilities for reconstructing and transforming society's basic social institutions with justice and fairness, although, as will become clear, this requires a broader interpretation of accounting, community and society. It has been noted that the debates concerning social and environmental accounting impact on the fundamental problem of inequity in liberal-capitalist societies (see Tinker 1985 Tinker , 1998 Tinker , 1999 Tinker et al. 1991) . Tinker et al. (1982 Tinker et al. ( , 1991 are concerned with the theoretical omissions implicit in modern procedural accounting frameworks, which many people have interpreted as revolving around the idea that nothing short of the overthrow of accounting will do. This perspective, however, is incorrect to the extent that Tinker et al. (1982 Tinker et al. ( , 1991 do not advocate violent revolutionary overthrow, but rather a revolution of consciousness using ideas drawn from Gramsci (1971) , Braverman (1974 ), and Marx (1971 , 1976 . Tinker, in particular, is interested in labour process and the transformation of capital (see Tinker 1985) . Tinker et al. (1991) were highly critical of the gradualism of Gray et al. (1987 because of the latter's questionable assumptions of pluralism, quietism and statism. 'Critical' accounting is committed to explaining the relationship between accounting and the state in a world where the processes of capital accumulation have become more acute than ever before. Explicit in the work of Tinker et al. (1982 Tinker et al. ( , 1991 ) is a concern with the ability of powerful interests to direct and influence state and government policy. It will be recalled that Puxty offered a slightly different focus on the communicative dimensions of accounting. While the differences are a matter of degree, the work of Tinker et al. (1982 Tinker et al. ( , 1991 focuses on the impediments to change in the system. It can be argued, following Tinker et al. (1991) , that more needs to be done to construct the assumptions within a coherent, fair and just liberal accounting. For example, reform accountants such as Gray and Owen have not discussed Puxty's left-wing Habermasian position, or the radical work that argues that without a critique of capitalism nothing will change. For example, Esposito et al. (1998, p. 49) explain that 'the human and environmental costs of disorganized capitalism of an unrestrained global free market are disastrous'. Moreover, modern liberal accounting's deferment to procedure does not explain the relationship between accounting and the state. It has been pointed out (see Puxty 1991; Tinker et al. 1991; Parker 1994 ) that at the core of the radical critique is a dialectic that is developed to consider how contradictory social relations are handled in communities. Here social and environmental accounting deals with palliatives and not causes, which reflects an undertheorised conception of the state. Critical accounting, in many instances, itself is based on dialectical logic, which can be used to explore the chaotic implications of political change while carefully noting tendencies and offsetting relationships.
II A placement ethic: political constructivism in the public sphere
The development of a placement ethic involves recognising the strengths and weaknesses implicit in the different schools of reform accounting (see Baynes, 1992) . It should be noted that differences exist between Puxty (1991) and Power and Laughlin (1996) . Puxty (1991) utilised Habermas' framework as part of a PostMarxian effort to explain the barriers to change implicit in capitalism, while Power and Laughlin focus on Habermas' discursive work as it applies to democratic theory. This reflects the search by Power and Laughlin (1996) for a pragmatic strategy to create new communicative pathways for social and environmental change (Power, 1993a (Power, , 1993b .
Interestingly, since the collapse of communism in 1989, recent work on social change has focussed on the institutions of liberal democracy (Blackburn, 1991) . Concomitantly, the Gray/Owen and Laughlin/Power schools of thought can be seen as offering an accounting framework that extends these philosophical developments to practical matters. Implicitly, they are arguing that radical social change is considered to be no longer feasible and they seemingly concur that we are at 'the end of history' (Fuyakama, 1989) . One way to explore critical accounting is to consider the liberal supposition that we are at the end of history. This task might begin by considering ideas derived from Habermas' Between Facts and Norms (1996) , together with Puxty's critical interpretation of social and, by implication, environmental accounting. The placement ethic reflects Habermas' notion of a discourse arena where differences are debated, and involves two steps. The first outlines key assumptions on which different theorists develop their insights (see section I). The second provides a means to reconstruct a radical and participative democratic system that is committed to explaining the possibilities open to humanity (see Esposito et al. 1998 ).
For reforming accounting, Rawls and Habermas develop a placement ethic to draw together different schools of thought (see section I). On the one hand, Habermas creates social change among people taken severally, and where assertions made by people are tested against the best standards that could ever be (the ideal speech situation). On the other, Rawls constructs his political liberal agenda to locate what is common among people through model-building techniques such as the original position and an overlapping consensus. Notwithstanding their political differences, it is important to recognise that they share the assumption of 'equality of respect' as constituting democratic accountability. Through the political principle of equal respect, 'reasonable' interlocutors are able to construct collective institutions that are committed to tolerance, self-respect and harmony. It offers a means to consider different evaluative systems such as social/environmental accounting. Power and Laughlin (1996) argue that discourse aimed at reaching cooperative and respectful understanding can guide the reformation of accounting. They observe that 'accounting, like science, cannot be dismissed out of hand' (p. 447), where accounting becomes an ethical outcome achieved through language. Habermas spends a great deal of time explaining the plurality of rights and observes that the nature of the theory of law is always open to interpretation, although he then proceeds to 'preserve a legitimate regulative function for administrative practices, such as accounting' (Power and Laughlin 1996; Habermas, 1996) . According to Habermas, the law, emancipation and freedom follow from unrestricted communication. In a sense, this reflects what Power and Laughlin (1996) see as the point of 'critical' theory that does not operate according to some transcendental point of reference, but which must emerge between facticity (positivism) and validity (normativity).
If critical accounting is to help resolve differences between the schools of thought on reform accounting, it is worth remembering that liberal theorists argue against Marx, who they maintain undertheorised the role of communication in communities. Therefore, the development of the placement ethic for accountability revolves around Habermas' argument that modern communities can be reformed to measure the sort of communication that is incompatible with the 'good life' (accountability). In this Kantian tradition, the work of Habermas and Rawls emphasises the role of 'procedure' in resolving political debates such as those in accounting.
10 Interestingly, Power and Laughlin (1996, p. 452) argue that the 'applied' turn in Habermas' work follows a neo-Rawlsian path. Power has commented that:
] Theory of Justice recognises that our ordinary moral concepts are laden with assumptions. In making these assumptions explicit Rawls is aiming for a 'rational reconstruction' of them which, undoubtedly, has normative implications. Certainly, our point of epistemological access to such reconstructions is via our 10 Rawls and Habermas have spelled out their different pragmatic proposals for change in the philosophical literature. See their recent exchange in the Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XCII, No. 3, 1995, pp. 132-180 and 109-131 respectively. present practices but the latter do not possess any priority just as our manifest behaviour has none in the context of psychoanalysis. (Power 1992, p. 54) Rawls' notion of 'reflective equilibrium' could be used to strengthen the standardsetting process, where 'reflective' processes are based on a 'deep theory of individual rights' (Rawls, 1988 (Rawls, , 1993 ). Yet, Habermas has taken a different turn from that of Rawls and argues that social change can be implemented through discourse. He maintains that discourse affects social institutions at two levels. The first level is the world of the economic, which is broadly concerned with humankind's domination over the natural world. The second level is the communicative realm:
The two levels are related, but independent. Thus although we acknowledge the Marxian insight that labour is fundamental in the economic process, and hence that the employment relation is necessarily one of exploitation, we do not thereby suppose that a political and social superstructure is as a result derivative of and dependent on that process. The level of human interaction has its own laws of development. (Puxty 1991, p. 42) In effect, Habermas argues that he has extended Marx's political economy perspective through linguistic structures that reflect sociality, reciprocity and linguistic competence. Here, Marx's emancipatory model is replaced by a theory of linguistic competence, which is an arena pertinent to accounting as annual reports are a medium of communication in the public sphere. The relevance of this insight is that true knowledge guides the development of the human subject, which is different from mere human interests and is based on 'ideas'. Accounting reform, moreover, can be effected through Habermas' claim that '[a]s far as philosophy is concerned, it might do well to refurbish its link with the totality by taking on the role of interpreter on behalf of the life-world' (Habermas 1987, p. 313 ; see also Baynes et al. 1991, p. 293 ).
In developing a placement ethic for reform accounting, it is important to note how Habermas has changed his position in Between Facts and Norms (1996) . He now attempts to build a bridge between Hegel's project of reconciliation and Kant's categorical imperative. Implicit in the discourse arena is a means to establish validity claims that accountants can use to reflect on the information they publish and on whether the assertions pass the truth tests outlined by Habermas in the discourse arena. For Habermas, the rules of discourse are crucial to establishing the conditions under which a certain normative statement can be recognised as valid. It is not so much the validity of the norms themselves, but that of the sociality that is created in the process of communication (modern accounting has failed dismally in this regard). Without this process, argues Habermas, a speaker and hearer cannot communicate. In an accounting context, this is an important point because it is problematic whether accounting reports provide this type of two-way dialogue. Habermas states:
...a speaker can rationally motivate a hearer to accept his speech act offer because...he can assume the warranty [Gewahr] for providing, if necessary, convincing reasons that would stand up to a hearer's criticism of the validity claim. Thus a speaker owes the binding (or bonding: bindende) force of his illocutionary act not to the validity of what is said, but to the coordinating effect of the warranty that he offers; namely, to redeem, if necessary, the validity claim raised with his speech act. (Habermas 1984, p. 302, emphasis in original) Habermas argues that, through discourse, social bonds of solidarity emerge from a complex interplay of social forces, where the ethical content of a discourse ethic can be found to apply to the wider social sphere. This is appealing to accounting because for a statement to be legitimate it must pass democratic procedures that provide opportunities to assess the extent to which the accounting statement, record or narrative contributes to social development. Power and Laughlin (1996) point out that Habermas acknowledges that these principles can find entry into a culture only 'where liberal principles are already rooted (facticity)' (Power and Laughlin 1996, p. 452) . The direct relevance of Habermas' communicative ethic is its democratic means of considering truth claims in communities and thereby avoiding the naturalistic fallacy, which involves the derivation of an ought statement rather than a statement of fact. Habermas' model assesses communication that is incompatible with the 'good', or better life, itself based on an 'ontology' of individualism. For accounting, the purpose of the placement ethic is to develop financial information communicated in a new, truthful way through discourse aimed at reaching cooperative and respectful understanding.
Thus, a placement ethic involves the democratisation and the enabling of accounting, through an exploration of the relationships between procedure and discourse. What Rawls and Habermas bring to bear is a way to restructure our political and accounting structures through a notion of the public sphere and accountability. Notwithstanding their philosophical differences, Habermas and Rawls facilitate thinking about the democratic and communicative implications of instrumental/procedural rationality for social and environmental accounting. They share awareness that the future of humanity depends on a revitalised public sphere, an insight that has been used by the reform school of thought in accounting (see Gray et al. 1995) . This point has purchase on Gray et al.'s (1995 Gray et al.'s ( , 1996 argument that reform can come about within the existing social system. Yet Gray et al.'s (1996) democratic solution misses the Habermasian observation that to defer our collective decisions to an overlapping consensus might render citizen self-determination out of bounds. 11 Gray et al. (1996) offer an interesting fusion of ideas to develop a placement ethic and reconstruct accounting so that 'expert cultures can be mediated with everyday practice' (Power and Laughlin, 1996, p. 446) . What is also needed is collective action to determine the direction of the community, the relationships between humanity and nature and how to temper the instrumental effects of procedural liberalism which have seeped throughout the community through a 'free market' supported by modern accounting techniques. 12 It has already been explained, procedural liberalism limits the predictive ability of the Gray/Owen and Laughlin/Power models to realise the fruits of democracy. For example, in narrowing his focus by relating emancipation to discourse, Habermas, and his talk of actual dialogue, can be misleading. It must be recognised that Habermas' own proceduralism gives a primary place to rationality: 11 For Habermas, as against Rawls, it is a fact that in asserting something we presuppose that the assertion can be justified, not merely on the basis of standards that we already accept, but also under highly idealised conditions that transcend all locally embedded forms of understanding … aesthetic criticism serves to guide perception and to make the authenticity of a work so evident that this aesthetic experience can itself become a rational motive for accepting the corresponding standards of value. (Habermas 1984, p. 20) This quote, while quite complex, means that agreement reached at the meta-theoretical level takes precedence over the 'value' that lies within a particular discursive truth claim. We are able to move from disagreement to agreement at a more general (rational) level and we constantly give ground to the superior position. A problem with the meta-ethical approach, appropriated by Gray/Owen and Laughlin/Power, is that they assume that a consensus can be reached in an idealised discourse arena. This problem reflects not so much the practicality of this suggestion, but the emphasis on 'procedures' which precludes full discussion of the relationships between accounting and the community, accounting and the state. In advocating the construction of better procedures to facilitate communication, the Habermasian accountant shares with neoliberals such as Gray a belief in the existing institutional structures for bringing about social and environmental reform. I argue that they have explored only the policy implications associated with accounting change and overlooked the ontological factors that shape that way of thinking. Thus, they deal with palliatives, not causes (see Owen et al. 1997 ).
Principally, Habermas emphasises the transcendental possibilities in the discourse process.
13 He argues that a viable democratic system is one that, in allowing people to assert facts that they can will satisfy the criteria for entry into the discourse arena. Habermas assumes that assertions can be justified not merely on the basis of standards that we already accept, but also under highly idealised conditions which transcend all locally embedded forms of understanding. His aim is to stand at the end of an infinitely extended conversation where differences are allowed to develop unstopped.
14 Reform accounting, reliant on procedural practical reason, maintains that society can redeem its normative ideals (expressive sources), which are not immersed in predetermined truth claims. It was for this reason that a placement ethic for accounting searched for that common element between Rawls and Habermas. This was the first step toward a process of discursive clarification in the public sphere. This led to an appreciation that both Rawls and Habermas shared a belief that the role of moral theory should be to single out a procedure only to validate particular norms and assertions in discourse. Habermas argues:
What moral theory can do and should be trusted to do is to clarify the universal core of our moral intuitions and thereby to refute value scepticism. What it cannot do is make any kind of substantive contribution. By singling out a procedure of decision making, it seeks to make room for those involved, who must find answers on their own to the moral-practical issues that come at them, or are imposed on them, with objective historical force. (Habermas 1990, p. 211) 13 This is Habemas' complex way of arguing that we need universal principles to guide our affairs. But, one wonders how universal are these laws when they are derived through procedure. 14 This strategy echoes Gray et al's (1995) attempt to illustrate the relationships between liberal reform and critical theory. At the meso-level this however confuses ontology with advocacy claims at the policy level.
Here, Habermas submerges social ethics (ethicus) within the parameters of morality (moralis). The net effect is to shift the Kantian injunction to universalise our moral maxims to the individual participants in the discourse process itself. What this does, however, is to rob practical reasoning and the placement ethic of its power to interpret and revise different goods from culture to culture and between accounting systems. Accounting remains a technically impoverished discourse guided by a cognitive conception of instrumental reasoning.
In thinking about the role of language and how technical accounting communicates different values we eventually narrow our ability to think broadly across issues. When we defer to an idealised speech situation primacy is accorded to procedures and rules. If accounting followed this path meaning, therefore, becomes the locus of the dispute rather than a problem of method. Effectively, this limits the interpretive role of accounting as questions of class and gender are not considered. Class and gender have important effects on social and environmental issues (see Cooper 1992) . For example, the alleged unity between humanity and nature, according to environmental accountants, relies on an epistemology steeped in procedure. It is alleged that this provides new avenues to allow accounting-business to hear other values such as the intrinsic value implicit in the natural environment.
All this being said, I am not suggesting that a Rawls-Habermas perspective on reform is without merit. Far from it, but accounting reformers need to also think about the practical and instrumental constraints that are imposed by the current social system. In this way both Habermas and Rawls seem to have transformed practical concerns into transcendental ideals that are to operate across time and space. Typically, we can learn of the dilemmas of others only when we engage in discussion and respect other interlocutors. It is problematic, however, whether discussion alone can change the injustices perpetuated under the auspices of late capitalist modernity, which brings us back to Hegelian dialectics and Marx's critical appropriation (next section).
III Placement Ethic: Problems and Possibilities
I have argued that the notion of a placement ethic is a useful device to create a discourse arena to consider the differences between proponents and critics of accounting reform. It offers the promise of moving beyond the usual deadlock between procedure and critique thereby providing a way to think about whether insights from different traditions can be combined in constructing new social and environmental accounting pathways. The placement ethic, therefore, is premised on the perspective that while environmental accounting might usefully moderate some adverse corporate impacts, these 'improvements' are only modifications within a fundamentally flawed economic system.
A useful way to consider the critical implications associated with the placement ethic is to refer to Young's (1990) stopping point notion to overcome procedural limitations thereby linking the placement process with a critical perspective on capitalism.
15
Young attempts to balance different political proposals without pushing any theory to its logical extreme in the endeavour to create a system other than one based on profit maximisation. She aims to establish what she calls 'stopping points' which have been summarised by the feminist scholar, Nicholson. She summarised Young's method in the following way:
...that theorising needs some stopping points and that for feminists an important theoretical stopping point is gender. To invoke the ideal of endless difference is for feminism either to self-destruct or to finally accept an ontology of abstract individualism. (Nicholson, 1990, p. 8) .
Put bluntly, a theory should not be extended to the point where its recommendations become contradictory and illogical. For example, liberalism could develop the fiction of abstract individualism to the ludicrous point of seeing the self as completely independent from the community and the natural environment. Marxism could be extended to totalitarianism. Thus, a placement ethic can be a guide to our thinking thereby avoiding the absurdities when a theory is pushed to its logical end-point. Using Young's stopping point to explore the differences in accounting involves awareness that reform accounting has only recently begun to participate in the processes of clarification and interpretation concerning its stance toward bourgeois political economy (see section II above). These problems are the focus of critical accounting, which reveals some cross-purposes, as the placement ethic is designed to make clearer. Though it is Habermas who has expressed grave reservations with Marx's political proposals. Habermas argues that Marx's dialectic and material conception of history is limited in that its focus is the economic sphere and offers only a holistic conception of society. This, Habermas maintains, leads to an instrumental understanding of revolution where the proletariat are considered to be the historical macro-subjects of change. Habermas has explained that:
The Critique of the Gotha Programme tells us in no uncertain terms that Marx understood a communist society to be the only possible realisation of democracy. Here, as in his earlier critique of Hegel's doctrine of the state, freedom consists solely in 'converting the state from an organ superimposed on society into one thoroughly subordinate to it'. But [Marx] does not say any more about the way freedom would be institutionalised; he is unable to imagine institutional forms beyond the dictatorship of the proletariat that he predicted would be necessary during the period of transition. (Habermas 1991, pp. 3-35) According to Habermas, Marx's work is limited in that it under-theorises communication in and between the channels in public spheres. It is, nevertheless, still 15 Tony Tinker has noted at conferences that Young's framework is epistemologically flawed as one never knows when to stop the iterative process. I believe that to understand the many dilemmas of late capitalism it is useful to locate points of intersection in the spirit of developing a universal strategy while exploring particular and local contingencies. possible to locate some points of intersection between the work of Habermas and that of Marx which involve critically reflecting on capitalism's ability to deflect critique and reform proposals. This component in the placement strategy, then, might overcome some of the procedural restrictions which limit dialectical and radical ways to think (outlined in Section II). This would involve using our faculty of practical reasoning to consider more fully the dimensions of what it means to be a human, and the factors which might lead us to a better life. A broader conception of practical reasoning, therefore, involves in part the development of the dialectic within the placement strategy to guide decision-making and consider the possibilities in reforming accounting. The development of a broader conception of practical reasoning, moreover, might develop a deeper appreciation of the implications of accounting and its social and environmental implications (see Power, 1992) . It might allow us to imagine a new way of being thereby escaping the restriction of procedural rationality (apodeictic).
Central to the argument of this article is that accounting reform, and the placement ethic can benefit from Marx's insight that capitalism deflects and absorbs critique. The placement ethic, in this way, must also be cognisant and constructed in a manner which is aware of Marx's radical critique (see Tinker, 1999 Tinker, , 2000 . 16 The placement ethic, however, also has the advantage that it can work to locate points of intersection between different positions concerning the role of accounting (and implicitly seeking its transcendence). Escaping Habermas' procedural restrictions it is possible to develop a placement ethic guided by dialectical logic. In this way, therefore, the placement ethic takes us beyond Gray et al.'s (1995) political economy position to provide a critical reflection on capitalism guided by dialectical logic (See Section II). Moreover, the critical enhancements to the placement ethic are built on an awareness that procedural reform models are caught within the essence of capitalism from which they cannot escape.
Capitalism creates a social system which contains within it systemic barriers that deflect attempts to reform the system (wesenlogik). That is, capitalism avoids reforms and has the ability to absorb and deflect critique. Interestingly, if we also consider the ethical implications of Marx's method it is possible that we can interpret his method as an attempt to re-orientate our thinking so that we challenge the current trajectory of social and environmental accounting. This, then, involves exploring the state's role in 16 Four principal factors stall the development of collective-democratic institutions that would work toward the reconstitution of the capitalist state (Smith 1990, pp. 202-205) . First, when we consider reform and arbitration we must consider the extent to which concentrated economic power seeps into the political sphere. That is, those with concentrated economic power are able to influence the political process. In an accounting context they are able to influence the conceptual framework projects which are already under way. Second, the state depends on capitalist interests for further capital accumulation and taxation revenue. The state relies on taxation payments and loans in the form of bonds to create jobs and maintain its own position. The state, that is, can enter into strategic partnerships with multinational and transnational corporations. Third, the state depends on the market for bonds to serve its capital interests and reflects the wealth and resources of privately owned capital to fund the rate of capital accumulation. The owners of capital have the ability to not purchase government bonds and can indirectly influence state policy. Last, capital is able to ensure that the state acts in the interests of capital by striking so that corporations do not have to comply with strict legislation ensuring standardised social and environmental rights. creating social change which underpins social and environmental accounting models (see also Rawls, 1971, p. 330) . The role of the state has important implications for the reformation of accounting as the possibilities 'inherent in contexts of action' are limited by these very same procedures (Power and Laughlin 1996, p. 462) . Nevertheless, radical critical accountants are right to insist that the various accounting schools of thought must also consider the economic and structural impediments to reform in capitalist societies (see Tinker et al. 1982) . While Gray et al.'s (1995) project of reforming accounting has attempted to fuse their liberalism with political economy, they overlooked the pathway provided through Marx's method which invites us to imagine new worlds where humanity relates better with the natural environment. This observation is made despite Marx's commitment to a communist blue-print which is guided by a vanguard political party. Yet, Marx's political proposals seem to be at odds with his avowed method which moves between theory and practice to uncover tendencies within social structures. It offers a means to orient our thinking thereby providing a link with broader means to think about accounting, community and society.
Reforming the public sphere, guided by the placement strategy, then, involves a dialectical method that begins with a category of simple unity and proceeds to explain ever more complex and abstract levels of the category while never losing sight of historical specifics. Reform proposals, such as the notion of a placement ethic, therefore, benefits by considering Habermas' (1991, pp. 33-35) observation that Marx's historical program failed to develop a perspective from which reality could be tested. He argued that 'against the power of a theoretical description to disclose reality and convey empirical content' (Habermas, 1991, p. 33) . Charles Taylor has summarised the implication of this observation where the processes of interpretation are reduced to procedure (Taylor 1995, p. 221) , a flight from the public into the narrower and less significant sphere of private satisfaction occurs. The placement ethic aims to create political 'insight', guided by dialectical logic, to explore the plural values implicit in the discourse arena, not all of which can be realised at any one moment in time and space.
In an environmental and social accounting context, placement strategies, derived from the work of Habermas and Rawls, must also recognise that instrumental reasoning. It is the constructive limitations associated with instrumental reason which limits how we think about the natural environment as it is contextualised by historical, culture and social mechanisms that transform the environment into productive capital. The depoliticised culture of modernity, moreover, devalues the public sphere by deferring to markets to create environmental awareness that leads only to an instrumental vision of the natural environment recorded through the technology of accounting. If a placement ethic is to consider the limits of capitalism together with the force contained within capitalism's unity of interests (see Habermas, 1992) we must recognise that 'information' and 'discussion' are not enough to transform the social fabric and the inter-and intra-class relationships which limit reform proposals in modern communities.
Thus, a placement ethic must also theorise the ability of capitalism to impose structural constraints on the creation of new pathways for accounting and society. Accordingly, accounting plays an ideological role in capital accumulation which is reflected in the limited role for the state in 'middle-of-the-road' accounting. The ability of the state to function depends on the 'economic' ability of the dominant class providing resources necessary to fund state and government operations. Moreover, citizens must be empowered against the colonising forces of instrumental reason to appreciate social and ecological factors through an expressive understanding of language. A first step is to create a critical-reflective democratic discourse that recognises that a placement ethic is part of a dialectical process of changing the role of accounting. This, then, provides the context in which accounting can be constructed as a means to critically interpret rates of capital accumulation and their effect on the natural environment. Thus, Habermasian and Rawlsian frameworks must confront four accounting questions:
• are accounting reports really concerned with providing information about a just allocation of resources?
• can social and environmental accounting be justified using the work of Rawls and Habermas?
• is it wholly proper to use alternative philosophical positions that may not be compatible?
• can accounting be enabled to act in the public interest?
Thus, reform accounting within the parameters of the current social system merely bolsters a vision of accountability that justifies an uncritical and non-dialectical social and environmental accounting model. Recent corporate social and environmental reporting frameworks neglect the state's role in a system committed to the accumulation of capital. The extent to which the state depends on the financial and business sector to provide its funds and resources, and how economic power seeps into the political sphere, are influenced by the concentration of economic power. The stronger the concentration of economic power the more limited is the role of reform through accountability perspectives. Moreover, the extent to which the accounting profession is able to use the techniques of corporate social and environmental reporting to mask their underlying tendency to transform nature into a profit could be overlooked by a political economy perspective that is devoid of ontology and critique. Thus Tinker et al.'s (1991) argument that some market participants have structural strengths must also be factored into our thinking about accounting reform.
Clearly, reform accounting must critically engage the procedural and structural limitations of capitalism. It might ask questions such as whether new accounting products are marketing devices to be reported in the environmental report (see Bebbington et al. 1994; Gray et al. 1996) . Nevertheless, reform seems more distant where the future is that of a nightmarish vision of a world where work never stops for some, but never begins for others. Such an instrumental world can only ever offer a vision of humanity which defines the natural environment in its own image (see Owen et al., 1997) . This is, of course, subject to the fact that a theory of justice is never a settled state of affairs, and the purpose of a theory of right is to outline the ground rules for this debate. The placement ethic developed using Habermas-Rawlsian insights, then, provides a vantage-point to critically determine the possibilities for reform in a world colonised by instrumental reason. Esposito et al. (1998) have explained some of the by-products of instrumental reason:
It would be naïve for everyone to be fully assuaged by reassurances of politicians and economists about the massive changes taking place around us. This would be blind to various forms of contravening evidence and signals. For we know that structural dislocations and job destruction characterize our globalizing economy, even if we can only dimly grasp what these changes will auger for the longer term. More than ever, we worry about work and are working longer hours; we are more than ever driven, nervous, seemingly trapped in a cybernetic cage perhaps ever more insidious than the steel one it extends. (Esposito et al. 1998, p. 13) Humanity trapped in an instrumental cage detaches ethics from a morality whereby our lives are directed by rules and procedure. Therefore, accounting reform guided through the notion of a placement ethic must also reject the discursive violence of modernity and expose the injustices, oppressions, social hierarchies and differences making up the social environment.
Conclusion
The usefulness of ideas central to Habermas and Rawls in reforming accounting is that both attempt to stabilise and resolve disputes using ethical principles of justice. As Power and Laughlin (1996) have explained, the rule of law in the discourse arena relegates other subsystems-such as accounting-to a minor position, even though current practice suggests precisely the opposite. I have argued that the ethical implications implicit in the work of both Habermas and Rawls are important theoretical resources in reforming accounting. I have argued, furthermore, that their commitment to universal principles, or rules of law, can limit the political means to express different 'sources of value' that many theorists believe exists, for example, in the natural environment. While interpretations differ concerning the democratic ideals central to both Rawls and Habermas, they share a commitment to the construction of pathways to create social change and justice.
Reflecting on the strands of accounting thought, a critical perspective is also required to overcome the 'procedural' limitations in liberal-discourse theory and so keep better faith with the democratic underpinning of liberal political theory. Of course, these arguments do not mean that a fully worked out solution to the differences concerning the serviceability of social and environmental accounting can be operationalised easily. Rather, a placement ethic provides a means to develop the tensions between reality (Faktizitat) and validity (Geltung), thereby creating new ways to think about accounting and what accounting means in late capitalist societies. Future research in accounting must seek not only to develop new and better accountings, but also to overcome the existing institutional barriers to change.
Reforming accounting involves not siding against radical reform, but to engage in 'praxis through practice' to struggle against the nightmarish scenario in which humanity faces a world committed to transforming nature into productive capital as a reflection of simplistic economic use values. Failure to do so will continue to leave social and environmental accounting open to the charge of relativism, quietism and going along with the crowd (Tinker et al. 1991) . A fruitful placement ethic for social and environmental accounting might critically encompass:
• the principle of equal respect to develop a stronger democratic foundation for critical and interpretive accounting;
• exploration of alternative conceptual frameworks which promote the interests of those with least access to information in society (see Gaa 1986 Gaa , 1988 ;
• an ability to incorporate key features of other theories and provide a means to determine the usefulness of these theories as opposed to simply providing rules to adjudicate between different theories;
• institutionalisation of a full publicity condition for the well-ordered society-a condition that projects the acceptance of social and environmental accounting as a means of achieving the full justification of the public conception of justice by addressing the democratic relationships between people and the state.
These principles would support an accounting framework that relied on principles of rationality, but would also involve reforming accounting as a medium of communication with communities. This implies that accounting principles would respect 'other' user needs, and thereby promote awareness that the marketplace is an inadequate reflection of a public sphere. In charting differences, social and environmental accounting can be developed in a decidedly critical direction, thereby exposing free-market inadequacies and the procedural limitations of reform accounting frameworks. In working through these frameworks a device of representation acts to create new possibilities and visions that may determine the democratic ability of institutions such as accounting to create social change. In effect this means finding a way to think about accounting and society: something far easier to suggest than to effect.
